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States Supreme Court, treating those orders received and shipped
directly from the head office and not forwarded or handled by
the Chicago office as being a form of interstate commerce, declared for an exemption from taxation. The test to be applied
would, then, seem to turn on whether the sale is (1) made within
the state, (2) is originated there by local agents even though
accepted and filled outside, or (3) is completed there by some
form of delivery made by or through the local agent, so as to
constitute a local transaction. All other dealings would appear
to be interstate in character, hence non-taxable.
TRADE REGULATION

Except for two decisions noted elsewhere, one dealing with
the right of a person doing business under an assumed name to
enforce the contracts so made, 2 and the other relating to the
validity of the 1947 Price Posting Act, 63 it could be said that no
issue of significance has developed in the field of trade regulation
under state law.
VIII.

TORTS

The derivative nature of certain tort causes of action is illustrated by two cases arising during the survey period. In the
first, that of Welch v. Davis,' the Appellate Court for the Third
District affirmed a judgment for defendant notwithstanding a
verdict in favor of plaintiff in a wrongful death action, brought
on behalf of a dependent daughter whose mother had been shot
and killed by her second husband prior to the time he killed himself, because of a belief that an administrator can successfully sue
only upon a showing that the decedent, if living, would have
been able to recover. On the basis that the Married Women's
62 See discussion relating to Grody v. Scalone, 408 Ill. 61, 96 N. E. (2d) 97 (1950)
under the heading of Contracts, particularly notes 1 to 3, ante.
63 Ante, this section, note 20, for the holding in Lombardo Wine Co. v. Taylor,
407 I1. 454, 95 N. E. (2d) 607 (1950).
1342 Ill. App. 69, 95 N. E. (2d) 108 (1950). On leave to appeal, the Supreme
Court, 410 I1. 130, 101 N. E. (2d) 547 (1951), not in the period of this survey,
reversed and declared the child's action was not derivative, hence not barred by the
fact that the mother, if she had survived, would have been unable to sue. See note
in 40 Il1. B. J. 242.
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Acts 2 had not disturbed the alleged common law rule prohibiting
the maintenance of a tort action by a wife against her husband for
personal injuries inflicted by him on her,3 the court held the
wrongful death suit to be derivative in character, hence barred
by the same reasoning. In the other case, that of Monken v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company,4 however, the Appellate
Court for the Fourth District permitted a husband to recover for
the destruction of his automobile and an even larger sum for
loss of his wife's consortium, growing out of a crossing collision,
while simultaneously denying a recovery for personal injuries
suffered by the wife, who drove the car in the husband's absence,
because she was found to be guilty of contributory negligence.
The holding was conditioned on the fact that it was made to appear that the wife was not then acting as agent or servant for
her husband so as to prevent an application of the doctrine of
imputed negligence. 5 There is occasion to doubt the validity of
one or the other of these two decisions since it would seem as if
the person seeking to recover on a tort committed by or against
a third person must rest his action either on an independent right
or else on one derived through another. If on the latter, the
derivative right should be subject to all those defenses which
would be available against a claim of invasion of the primary
right.
Only one other case dealt with an issue of tort law not comprehended within the general topic of negligence and that was
the libel suit entitled Mitchell v. Tribune Company6 The newspaper there concerned had published two stories relating to plaintiff in which it had given plaintiff's name, had included the
nickname of "Chink," and had referred to him as "Negro."
Plaintiff apparently believed these additions to his name to be
libelous per se, possibly because he thought the appellation
"Chink" was intended to represent him to be Chinese, which he
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 1 et seq.
s Main v. Main, 46 Il1. App. 106 (1892).
4 342 I1. App. 1, 95 N. E. (2d) 130 (1950).
5 Palmer v. Miller, 380 Il1. 256, 43 N. E. (2d) 973 (1942).
6 343 Ill. App. 446, 99 N. E. (2d) 397 (1951). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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was not, and so too with respect to "Negro."
In a brief opinion,
the Appellate Court for the First District held it proper to strike
a complaint based on such allegations, but lacking in any statement of special damage, because the references were said not
to be libelous per se, 7 without which plaintiff had no case. The
printing of "fighting" words by way of characterization would
seem, however, to be a developing form of actionable defamation. 8
Negligence cases were both varied and interesting. The
attractive nuisance case of Smith v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois
Railroad Company9 represents no new turn in the law on that
subject but it does serve to emphasize a predilection on the part
of Illinois courts in favor of the majority view with respect to
liability for artificial accumulations of water so as to form attractive nuisances1 ° while also providing a cautionary note regarding the proof necessary in such cases. The railroad there
concerned had, at one time, created an artificial reservoir on its
land, adjacent to a highway, for use in servicing its locomotives
but had discontinued such use leaving the property open to fishermen, swimmers and the like who frequented the property. A
pier which had, at one time, there been maintained had collapsed
but the timbers had been allowed to remain and to project into
the pond slightly below the surface of the water." The decedent,
a neighboring child under two years of age, was found floating on
the surface of the water, within an hour after it had last been
seen, bearing an extensive bruise on the side of its head. There
was no medical testimony that death had been caused by drowning
and it was problematical whether or not the child had fallen
against the timbers of the pier and, knocked unconscious thereby,
7 The court relied on Wright v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 281 Il. App. 495 (1935).
8 See, for example, Dilling v. Illinois Pub. & Ptg. Co., 340 Ill. App. 303, 91 N. E.
(2d) 635 (1950).
9 343 Ill. App. 78, 95 N. E. (2d) 95 (1950).
10 On that point, see note on Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 228 Ind. 518,
92 N. E. (2d) 632 (1950), in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEW 172.
11 The presence of additional attractive features Is important in view of the contrast provided by Peers v. Pierre, 336 Ill. App. 134, 83 N. E. (2d) 20 (1948), and
Pekin v. McMahon, 154 11. 141, 39 N. E. 484, 27 L. R. A. 206, 45 Am. St. Rep. 114
(1895).
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had ended up in the water. A judgment for the administrator of
the child's estate, in a wrongful death action following the attractive nuisance theory, was reversed by the Appellate Court
for the Third District because it found a fatal variance between
the proof and the complaint which had charged the proximate
cause of death had been by drowning. The court indicated that
it could have reached the same result on the basis that the
artificially accumulated water was not, per se, an attractive
12
nuisance.
Presence of a duty on defendant's part is, of course, an
essential element in every negligence case. Carelessness on the
part of a lender who had demanded that the borrower take out,
and pay for, collision insurance on an automobile, which was
mortgaged as security for the payment of both loan and insurance
premium, back-fired in the case of Schmidt v. Sinclair.1 The
Appellate Court for the First District there found it to be
the duty of, and not merely an act of accommodation on the part
of, the lender to promptly procure and pay for the insurance.
It was, therefore, found possible to subject him to liability for
damages incurred when he failed to procure insurance for approximately thirty days after the loan transaction and, in the
interim, the automobile, in the possession of the borrower, had
become damaged in a collision. An attempt to avert liability on
the theory that, if insurance had been promptly procured, it
would not have covered the particular loss was rejected as being
without merit.
Automobile guest cases also involve problems over the duty
owned by the driver to his guest. In that regard, there has been
difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory definition of wilful and
wanton conduct for use in such cases because simple negligence
will be inadequate for purpose of recovery. 1 4 The problem is
12 Reliance was placed on Wood v. Consumers Co., 334 Il. App. 530, 79 N. E. (2d)
826 (1948).
13 342 Ill. App. 484, 97 N. E. (2d) 129 (1951).
14 IUl. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 95%, § 58a, denies the guest a right to recover
against the owner or operator, for injuries arising from the operation of the automobile in which the guest is riding, unless the accident "shall have been caused by
the wilful and wanton misconduct" of the driver of such vehicle.
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particularly acute where the court is asked, as on a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, to decide as a matter of
law that the precise conduct on defendant's part was or was not
wilful and wanton. A violation of a speed regulation", or a failure to apply brakes 16 will not, alone, establish a guest case but,
17
according to Levanti v. Dorris,'
a combination of these factors,
especially when added to an attempt to negotiate a highway curve
near a marked cross road and a traffic warning sign, in the face
of cars approaching in full view, could well amount to wilful and
wanton conduct on the part of the driver. A special finding of
wilful and wanton misconduct, based on proof of that character,
was there approved.
The defense of assumption of the risk, not entirely eliminated
from the law, appeared in two rather novel situations. While
certain types of workers may be said to assume risks inherent
in their occupations, they are entitled to protection against unusual or extra-ordinary conditions of which the employer may
be aware. A racing jockey sued a horse owner, in the first case,
a negligence action entitled Gray v. Pflanz,'8 basing his claim
on the theory that the proximate cause of his injury, produced
when the horse he was riding crashed into a fence during the
running of a race, was the owner's failure to warn him of an
unusual peril, to-wit: that the horse was blind. A judgment for
plaintiff was ordered reversed by the Appellate Court for the
Fourth District when it failed to find evidence in the record that
the defendant, who had hired the jockey to ride the race, was in
any way aware of the horse's blindness, if in fact it was blind,
or had represented its condition to be sound. Absent such knowledge or representation, the court said the risk was one inherent
in the particular occupation for which no recovery could be
permitted.
15 Bartolucci v. Falleti, 382 Ill. 168, 46 N. E. (2d) 980 (1943).
16 Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 52 N. E. (2d) 229 (1944).
17343 Ill. App. 355, 99 N. E. (2d) 398 (1951).
Leave to appeal has been denied.
18 341 Ill. App. 527, 94 N. E. (2d) 693 (1950).
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An attempt was made in the second case, that of Meyer v.
Riverview Park Company,19 to extend the doctrine of the case
of Neering v. Illinois Central Railroad Company,20 one which
would hold a carrier liable for injury done to a passenger by the
criminal assault of a trespasser or the like, permitted to intrude
upon a railroad station, to a case involving a dispute between two
patrons of the same ride in defendant's amusement park. Following one seemingly insignificant assault over a tussle for a seat, the
plaintiff shortly thereafter placed himself in a position where he
could be, and was, severely injured by his original assailant. He
sued the amusement park owner on the theory that it had the
duty, by reason of its knowledge of the prior altercation, to
protect him, a fare-paying passenger, from further assaults. The
court held that one element of the Neering doctrine required that
the passenger should, himself, exercise due care to avoid assault,
which element it found to be lacking in the instant case inasmuch
as plaintiff, instead of seeking protection from defendant's employees had deliberately exposed himself to the possibility of
danger. Recovery was, therefore, denied.
Railroad and highway crossing collisions occur most frequently because both the train and the automobile involved are
in motion at the time but the presence of a stalled automobile on
a track at a highway crossing is not an unknown phenomenon
and more than one serious accident has been caused thereby.
21
The case of Janjaninv. Indiana.HarborBelt RailroadCompany,
dealing with that type of situation, is interesting because the
court said it could find no state authority as to the degree of duty
on the part of the autoist to discover the perilous nature of his
predicament, and to abandon his effort to preserve his property
in the interest of saving his life or limb, in the face of an onrushing train. The railroad had there urged adoption of the federal
19 342 Ill. App. 379, 96 N. E. (2d) 379 (1950). Leave to appeal has been denied.
20383 Ill. 366, 50 N. E. (2d) 497 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RVIEW
152.
21343 Ill. App. 491, 99 N. E. (2d) 578 (1951). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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view on the subject, 22 one which requires the driver to vacate,
rather than to remain in, a position of known danger so as to make
him guilty of contributory negligence if he does not leave but continues in his effort to rescue his property. It sought, in that
fashion, to provide support for the action of a trial judge in denying a new trial and entering judgment for the defendant carrier
notwithstanding a verdict for the driver-plaintiff. The Appellate
Court for the First District, however, disapproved that view of
the law, except as it might be applied in cases where the crossing
is located on a little traveled road in a rural area where the likelihood of a stalled car is relatively rare, and preferred to hold that
it was equally the duty of the railroad to be alert for the possibility, in well populated areas, so at to be able to prevent harm
to the stalled car and its driver if conscious of his presence in
time to avoid injury. The court did not advocate adoption of a
"last clear chance" doctrine but did say it was irrational to expect that a reasonable man would immediately abandon his stalled
automobile, to remove himself from a place of potential danger,
when by dint of some effort he might not only preserve his own
property but also prevent injury to others in the event a train
was derailed by the collision, particularly where he was given
no special warning of the approach of the train. It refused,
therefore, to conclude that the decedent, killed in such a collision,
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and
ordered the verdict reinstated.
This survey might well be closed with a word of caution to
some, if not all, members of the Illinois bar in whose interest it
is prepared. Personal injury lawyers in the Chicago area must
certainly take note of the holding in Schuman v. Chicago Transit
Authority.23 The Supreme Court there held the notice provisions
of the statute creating the transit authority 24 to be constitutional
22 See Gulf, M. & 0. R. Co. v. Freund, 183 F. (2d) 1005 (1950).
a dissenting opinion.
23 407 Ill. 313, 95 N. E. (2d) 447 (1950).
24 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, § 341.

Johnsen, J., wrote
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and affirmed a judgment dismissing the cause for non-compliance
with the statute. The case also indicates that the furnishing of
an accident report to the authority is not the type of notice required by law, 25 but that formal notice, of the sort customarily
used in cases involving personal injury claims against municipalities, 2 is to be desired. Prompt preparation and service of
such a notice may be vital to the success of the client's cause.

25 See also Hayes v. Chicago Transit Authority, 340 Ill. App. 375, 92 N. E. (2d)
174 (1950).
26 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 1-11. See also Kennedy v. City of Chicago,
340 Ill. App. 100, 91 N. E. (2d) 138 (1950), noted in 28 CHiCAG0-KENT LAW RLwIEW
380-1, on the type of notice required in suits based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1,
Ch. 38, § 512 et seq.

